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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The proceeding before the Third District Court was an action for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty,fraud,and bad faith involving Garrett Prince who was
injured by the Defendant's misconduct (hereinafter "Plaintiff), plaintiff and appellant,
and State Bear River Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Bear River"), defendant
and appellee, Civil number 9 7 0 9 0 5 6 4 1 . (R. 1). The primary issue presented to the
district court was whether Bear River owed indemnification to Plaintiff under his
automobile insurance policies containing personal injury protection coverage ("PIP")
despite Bear River's claim that some of his incurred medical expenses were "not
reasonable and necessary." (R. 25).
Other defendants and plaintiffs were not added to the action before the district
court because the court refused to permit the complaint to be amended to include class
certification and inclusion of the insurance doctor as a co-defendant. (R. 485).
STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j),
UTAH CODE ANN.

(1953, as amended).

COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff filed his complaint on August 11,1997. (R. 1). On October 1,1997
Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the court to interpret the
no-fault statute and to rule that Bear River breached its contract by attempting to impose
conditions, exclusions and limitations which are not authorized by the no-fault statute.
1

(R. 20). Plaintiffs motion was supported by affidavits and admissible evidence. (R. 4872). Bear River failed to properly dispute any of the admissible facts presented by
Plaintiff in its opposition memorandum. (R. 86-87). Bear River filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on January 23,1998 alleging that its affirmative defenses and factual
disputes should be resolved in its favor. (R. 144). Bear River's motion was unsupported
by any admissible evidence; instead it was "supported" by the conclusory assertions made
by its insurance doctor and its claims adjuster. (R. 155-163). Judge Thorne made an oral
ruling in favor of Bear River "for the reasons stated by Bear River" on February 9, 1998
and the order was entered April 1,1998.1 (R. 189). Plaintiff filed a Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal on April 16,1998 asking that this Court determine that Bear River
breached its contract by failing to pay PIP benefits when due based upon the subjective
opinion of an insurance doctor and the phrase "reasonable and necessary." (R. 194). The
Petition was denied without comment on August 11,1998. (R. 197).
Plaintiff filed written discovery on January 26, 2000. Bear River brazenly refused

1

On or about March 30, 1998, Garrett Prince settled his tort claim against the
tortfeasor's liability carrier for $26,000.00. In connection with that settlement, Plaintiffs
counsel negotiated full reimbursement by the tortfeasor's liability carrier to Bear Paver.
Upon being notified by the third-party carrier that it would reimburse the full $3,000.00 in
PIP expenses, Bear River's claims adjustor attempted to scuttle the settlement by telling
the third-party carrier that Plaintiff had failed to overcome the tort threshold as a result of
her refusal to pay more than $1,900.00 in PIP medical expenses. After the third-party
carrier consulted a competent attorney, the case was settled in spite of Bear River's
objections, and a check for $3,000.00 was sent to Bear River. Bear River allegedly paid
the remainder of Mr. Prince's PIP expenses shortly after receiving assurances of full
reimbursement from the third-party carrier.
2

to respond to any of the discovery based upon its conclusory allegation that the issues
were "moot." After unsuccessful efforts to obtain cooperation, Plaintiff filed a motion to
compel on December 15,2000. (R. 434).
Bear River filed a second unsupported motion for summary judgment on February
16,2000. (R. 202). Judge Thorne denied Bear River's motion through an order dated
June 3,2000. On July 25,2000, Bear River filed a motion styled "Motion for
Determination of Attorney Fees." (R. 239). Bear River asserted that it should be relieved
of its obligation to provide attorney fees because "Plaintiff had done nothing to pursue its
breach of contract claim beyond filing the complaint." (R. 247). A Minute Entry was
signed by Judge Dever on October 3,2000 which adopted Bear River's assertions and
purported to grant Bear River's "motion." (R. 268).
Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59 on October 13,2000 objecting to Bear
River's misstatements and the trial court's adoption of those misstatements and asking the
court to reverse its prior rulings granting summary judgment to Bear River. (R. 273).
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to include all parties and all claims injured by
Bear River's course of conduct under the no-fault statute. (R. 355). On January 12,
2001, Judge Dever denied Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint, ruled that Bear
River owed interest, and ruled that Bear River owed attorney fees, and refused to overrule
the orders entered by Judge Thome. (R. 485). On February 27,2001 Judge Dever
executed an order awarding costs, and attorney fees for only 3 hours. (R. 528). The
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 26,2001. (R. 531).
3

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Did the trial court err in ruling that an insured person's entitlement to
PIP benefits is contingent upon the condition precedent or subject to a condition
subsequent that a previously undisclosed third-party (in this case a doctor retained by the
PIP carrier) must subjectively deem expenses incurred by the insured person to be
"reasonable and necessary" and "related" to the accident? Reviewed for correctness.
Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992); Mills v. Brodv. 929 P.2d
360, 362 (Utah App. 1996) (explaining that questions of statutory interpretation and the
interpretation of unambiguous contractual provisions present questions of law, and "in
reviewing the trial court's decision, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the
losing party.").
B. May a defendant raise the affirmative defense "fairly debatable" for the
first time in a motion? Reviewed for correctness. See Creekview Apartments v. State
Farm Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693, 694 (Utah App. 1989); see also Heritage Bank & Trust v.
Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah App. 1989).
C. Did the trial court err in granting Defendant's unsupported motion for
partial summary judgment "for the reasons set forth by Bear River"? Reviewed for
correctness. Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,445 (Utah 1996);
K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994).
D.

Did the trial court err in ruling that the seven exclusions and

4

limitations set forth in the no-fault statute at section 309 were permissibly augmented by
Bear River's "IME" doctor's disagreement with the treating physician? Reviewed for
correctness. McCafferv v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990) (explaining that the
Utah no-fault statute "prevents the insurer from excluding PIP benefits to its insureds
except in seven narrowly defined situations" set forth in Section 309).
E. Did the trial court err in ruling that Pennington v. Allstate permits Bear
River's self-devised medical management exclusion even though this case does not
involve any allegations that medical expenses were incurred in bad faith? Reviewed for
correctness. Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973) ("If the reason for the rule
is not present, the rule does not apply.").
F. Did the trial court err in ruling that Bear River's breach of its duty of good
faith and fair dealing would be first-party bad faith in the PIP context and that Plaintiff,
therefore "had no standing"? Reviewed for correctness. Beck v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (explaining that third-party bad faith exists where
the parties have a confidential relationship and a corresponding duty of trust such as the
relationship created by the no-fault statute).
G. Did the trial court err in granting Bear River's motion for summary
judgment where, instead of being supported by admissible evidence, asserted that it was
entitled to a summary judgment because it had "no evidence" as a result of conducting no
discovery? Reviewed for correctness. K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah
1994) (In response to an unsupported motion, the non-moving party may rely on his
5

pleadings and "is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for
trial.") (citing Rule 56(e) and Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah
1994)): see also Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 1984); Parrish v. Lavton City
Corp.. 542 P.2d 1086,1087 (Utah 1975).
H.

Did the trial court err in determining that Bear River's conduct was

"fairly debatable" where the Defendant did not plead such an affirmative defense and
where the only evidence and argument presented by the Defendant was a recilation of the
rule "when a claim is fairly debatable an insurer is entitled to debate it"? Reviewed for
correctness. See Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693, 694 (Utah
App. 1989); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461,465 (Utah 1996).
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider the
proper relationship between a PIP carrier and its insured and, based upon the
inappropriate legal conclusion, refuse to permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint to add
allegations permitted under Rule 23? Reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Clark v.
Hansen. 631 P.2d 914,915 (Utah 1981); State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994);
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah App. 1994); Wickham v.
Fisher. 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981); Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966,
971 (Utah 1982); Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993); Wilcox v.
Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d 367,369 (Utah 1996); Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson. 831
P.2d 86,92 (Utah 1992); Dixon v. Stoddard. 627 P.2d 83 (Utah 1981); Hjorth v.
Whittenbure. 241 P.2d 907 (Utah 1952).
6

J. Did the trial court err in reducing Prince's attorney fees to three hours
which would be "sufficient for filing a complaint" where filing a complaint bore no
relationship to the actual work which was necessary? Reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1998).
K. Did Bear River misrepresent the procedural and substantive facts to
Judge Dever when it baldly asserted that Plaintiff had not made any effort to pursue the
breach of contract claim because interpreting its alleged defense to contractual liability
(i.e., the terms of the contract) "clearly" did not include its "reasonable and necessary"
assertions? Reviewed for correctness. Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr.. 2000 UT
90, U 19, 15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law in the
jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to properly
assess the law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel make in litigation.").
In interpreting a contract, the court must determine what the parties intended by
examining the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an
objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole. Sears v. Riemersma.
655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982). The cardinal rule is to give effect to the intentions
of the parties and, if possible, to glean those intentions from the statutory contract itself.
LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). Additionally, a
contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its terms and provisions, and all of
its terms should be given effect if possible. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
7

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs paid an insurance premium to

Defendant Bear River in return for which Defendant Bear River became obligated to
provide, among other things, personal injury protection ("PIP") conforming to the
requirements of the Utah Automobile No Fault Insurance Act as set forth at UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 31A-22-306, 307, 308 & 309 {the "no-fault statute"). (R. 48).
2.

Mr. Prince was hurt in an accident, and incurred medical expenses in excess

of $3,000.00. (R.48).
3.

Bear River paid part of Mr. Prince's PIP medical expenses in the sum of

$1,921.34 under the PIP coverage portion of Mr. Prince's insurance policy. (R. 48).
4.

Bear River retroactively denied PIP coverage suspended payment of Mr.

Prince's PIP benefits pending an examination by Stephen P. Marble, M.D. — Bear
River's "independent" medical examination ("'IME'") doctor. (R. 48).
5.

Mr. Prince obtained his own "IME" from Dennis J. Wyman, M.D. (R. 48).

6.

Dr. Wyman believed that all expenses incurred by Mr. Prince were causally

related to the accident and that Mr. Prince suffered a permanent injury. (R. 48).
7.

Dr. Marble also believed that all expenses incurred by Mr. Prince were

causally related to the accident and that Mr. Prince suffered a permanent injury. (R. 48).
8.

Dr. Marble believed, in addition, that Mr. Prince's chiropractic treatments in

excess of twelve weeks were "not medically necessary" because the treatments were
merely "palliative" and not "curative" — each treatment session only provided relief from
8

pain for approximately two days. (R. 48).
9.

After receiving the report prepared by its doctor, Bear River advised Mr.

Prince that it would only pay PIP benefits for the first 12 weeks of his chiropractic
treatment. (R. 48).
10.

The sole basis for Bear River's decision was that it believed its doctor would

not have prescribed more than 12 weeks of treatment; therefore, Bear River asserted that
the expenses Mr. Prince incurred were not "reasonable and necessary" and, thus, were
excluded from coverage. (R.. 48).
11.

Bear River's insurance adjuster advised that its refusal to pay Mr. Prince's

PIP benefits was based upon its desire to reduce the insurance rates paid by its insureds
— Bear River's fear is that if it pays expenses that its doctor describes as not "medically
necessary," the tortfeasor's insurer might argue that those expenses were not "reasonable
and necessary" and might not reimburse all of Mr. Prince's PIP expenses pursuant to
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 31 A-22-309(6)(a), -(b); therefore, Bear River might suffer a "loss"

if it paid Mr. Prince's PIP benefits. (R. 70).

SUMMARY O F THE ARGUMENT
The no-fault statute is not horribly complicated: If an insured suffers losses that
his or her doctor attributes to a covered event, the PIP carrier pays the insured's incurred
expenses subject only to the reasonable value of the services or accommodations (as
defined in the Relative Value Study), the $3,000 coverage limit, and the seven

9

permissible exclusions. There is nothing else to it.
Bear River refused to pay PIP benefits when due. Instead, it asserted the existence
of an exclusion which does not, in fact, exist. It misrepresented the terms of the no-fault
statute and simply asserted that "reasonable and necessary" is a "recognized standard"2
which means that its doctor is authorized to interpret its contract and determine its
obligations.
The term "necessary" does have meaning. It is part of the proof of loss
requirement, and that requirement was satisfied by Plaintiffs' presentation of "reasonable
proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" pursuant to Section 309. Plaintiffs'
doctors affirmed that the medical treatments they prescribed and billed their patients for
were "necessary." Nothing more is required.

ARGUMENT
I.

PIP COVERAGE IS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE FOR THE
INCURRING OF EXPENSES.

A contract for PIP coverage is a "contract." A contract defines the terms of the
parties' agreement. When one party alleges that the other party breached the contract, the
first step involves interpreting the language of the contract. If a party's actions are

2

"Note that the no-fault systems in this country are wholly statutory systems. It is
incumbent upon any practitioner to ascertain the exact language of the statute in effect at
the pertinent time, as the statute is the primary source of both rights under the plan, and
the procedures to be followed in obtaining those rights." Couch on Insurance 3d,
§125:1.
10

inconsistent with its contractual obligations, that party has breached its contract. It is
impossible to determine what the contractual obligations of a party are without reading
and understanding the actual language of the contract. Bear River's bare assertion that its
defense which it calls "reasonable and necessary"3 is not relevant to Plaintiffs claim that
it breached its contract is palpably without merit. See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance
Ctr., 2000 UT 90, % 19,15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law
in the jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to
properly assess the law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel make in
litigation.").
The relevant facts underlying Bear River's refusal to pay PIP benefits were
undisputed. The judicial interpretation of statutory provisions poses only questions of
law, which are reviewed for correctness. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033,
1038 (Utah 1989); Guardian State Bank v. Lambert. 834 P.2d 605, 606-07 (Utah App.
1992). Nevertheless, Bear River asserted that interpretation of its contract was a question
of fact, and Judge Thorne agreed because he thought a jury should determine whether
expenses were "reasonable and necessary."4 (R. 191).

3

The duties owed by the parties to the insurance contract are enforced by the
insurance contract. Contract duties are strictly enforced and are not subject to a standard
of reasonableness.
4

Where broad discretion is granted to a decision-maker, this Court has properly
employed the "reasonable and necessary" lingo. For example, district courts have broad
discretion when deciding whether attorney fee awards are for "reasonably necessary"
attorney services. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). It is
11

PIP coverage is a type of "expense policy." See, e ^ , Wulffenstein v. Deseret
Mutual Benefit Assoc. 611 P.2d 360 (Utah 1980) ("Throughout the description of
benefits accorded, references are to types and amounts of charges, not to the cause of
such expenses."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309(5)(a) ("Payment of the benefits
provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are
incurred.") (emphasis added) accord Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.. 559 P.2d 958
(Utah 1977) (explaining that the no-fault statute "should be construed in conformity with
the fundamental principle[5] of insurance law, that the purpose of insurance is to
indemnify for losses or damages suffered . . . . " ) .
Bear River insists, however, that PIP coverage is an illusory promise creating its

axiomatic that an administrative agency has not only those powers expressly conferred on
it by statute, but also those powers that are "reasonably necessary" to accomplish its
designated purposes. See Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 350 (Utah 1991).
And in tort law, an injured person must demonstrate that medical expenses are
"reasonable and necessary." See Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970,
981 (Utah 1993) (noting the foundational evidentiary requirement for compensation in
tort action is that expenses be reasonable and necessary).
5

This fundamental principle, standing alone, is good law. Plaintiff incurred
expenses and was entitled to indemnification.
Plaintiff notes, in passing, that the dissent in Jamison was the better-reasoned
opinion. The majority helped create a "subtle distinction" which, during the past 25 years
has been stretched into a "gaping loop-hole" through which overreaching insurers now
drive a truck. The dissent properly stated the correct rule of law which should have
prevailed: "The legislative design of the statute was to eliminate any valuation proof, e.g.,
were the household services of minimal or great value, and to set a flat rate. The sole
issue under this statute is whether the party would have performed household services,
but for the injury. If he would have, he is entitled to the statutory benefit." Id.
12

reciprocal obligation6 of indemnification only when its doctor subjectively agrees with all
of the treating physician's opinions about what treatment was "necessary."
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-22-307(l)(a) provides that injured motorists are entitled

to recover, from their own insurer, "the reasonable valuef] of all expenses for necessary
medical" treatment. Id. Bear River simplistically emphasizes the second word
"reasonable" (while diligently ignoring its status as a defined term), injects8 the
conjunction "and," and combines them with the eighth word "necessary." It, thus, claims
that this so-called "recognized standard" (which it refuses to define or explain9) permits it
to deny payment of PIP benefits to insureds who have incurred medical expenses while
ignoring its obligation to indemnify its insureds for "all expenses . . . within 30 days." (R.
132).

6

Bear River's analysis would transform it from an insurance company into an
entity that receives premium payments in exchange for accepting little or no risk.
7

"Reasonable value" is a defined term which references the Insurance
Commissioner's relative value study ("RVS"). Therefore, Bear River's "reasonable and
necessary" assertions are misleading for that reason alone.
8

"We will not insert words into a policy under the guise of interpretation
Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'v. 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989).
9

"

The assertions made by Bear River are essentially "causation" type arguments.
In tort law, causation is whatever the judicial system deems a sufficient contribution to an
event such that legal consequences should attach. In contract law, causation is whatever
the contract defines it to be. One commentator notes that language of causation is simple,
but it disguises extremely complex and difficult legal questions. See Robert H. Jerry II,
Understanding Insurance Law. § 67[a] (2d ed. 1996); see also Allen v. Industrial
Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15,22-27 (Utah 1986) (reviewing the standards, measures of proof,
burdens of proof, and procedural safeguards regarding "causation" under the Workers'
Compensation Act).
13

Defendant's emphasis of only certain words in the statute ignores a
fundamental principle of statutory construction, that "terms of a
statute are to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a
piecemeal fashion."
Business Aviation of South Dakota. Inc. v. Medivest Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah
1994).
The word "necessary" is not defined10 in the no-fault statute. It can hardly be
doubted that the word "necessary" is ambiguous. The word must, therefore, be
interpreted in the light most favorable to coverage11 which means that the only restriction
on the scope of coverage is that reasonable expenses must be incurred in good faith.
II.

THE WORD "NECESSARY" IS A COLLATERAL
REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR CONDITION
CONTAINED IN THE COVERAGE (i.e., RISK) CLAUSE.

Sometimes legalese is easier to understand than plain language.12 The word
10

The word "necessary" cannot be defined as "indispensable" in a remedial
statute. Fleming v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co.. 38 F. Supp. 204, 206 (D.Pa. 1941).
"Medically necessary" has been defined by the legislature and administrative agencies in
many different ways and "utilization reviews" have been regulated.
11

This statement is not completely true because the no-fault statute, as a whole, is
not ambiguous because it clearly and unequivocally requires PIP carriers to pay PIP
benefits within 30 days of receiving notice that expenses were "incurred." The statement
is an acceptable generalization of the "ambiguity principle" or the doctrine of "contra
proferentem" as a retort to Bear River's binary logic and piecemeal statutory analysis
which consists of nothing more than the comparison of an adjective ("necessary") with its
antonym ("not necessary").
12

For example, Bear River insists on calling its doctor's conclusion relying on
"reasonable and necessary" a "recognized standard." Bear River refuses to explain what,
if anything, "reasonable and necessary" means, and its "clarifying" term "recognized
standard" is absolutely unintelligible. Plaintiffs are, therefore, forced to fully argue Bear
River's mere assertions so that the flaws inherent in its analysis can be laid bare. See
14

"necessary" is contained in a clause which extends coverage to the insured. In other
words, it is contained in the clause which defines the amount of the risk which is to be
transferred to the PIP carrier through the contractual relationship (hereinafter the
"coverage clause" or "scope of coverage").
More precisely, the word "necessary" is either: (a) a coverage term which limits
the risk transferred by the policy, or (b) a collateral representation, warranty or condition.
See Couch on Insurance 3d, §101:6. If the word "necessary" were a coverage term, the
analysis of its use would involve identifying the additional burden which could be placed
upon the insured and the resulting process's effect on the insured's substantive right of
indemnification; whereas, if the word "necessary" is a collateral representation, condition
or warranty, it relates to a subjective representation13 made by the insured which, if
breached (by the insured's fraud or bad faith), would give rise to a PIP carrier's right to
attempt to void the underlying insurance contract.
The word "necessary," unlike the defined term "reasonable value," is a collateral
representation, warranty or condition which does not limit the coverage14 available to an

Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr.. 2000 UT 90, f 19,15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is
obliged to assess the black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to
act accordingly. This obligation to properly assess the law extends to the legal assertions
a party and its counsel make in litigation.").
13

See, e.g.. Couch on Insurance 3d, §81:40 (explaining that a subjective
representation is a promise which is based upon intention or opinion and is not
susceptible of present knowledge; thus, good faith is the only criterion of truth).
14

If "necessary" were intended as a coverage term resulting in a limitation on the
amount recoverable, it would have been defined by the legislature; otherwise the word
invites litigation and inefficiency.
15

insured. Rather, it serves as the insured's promise of good faith in connection with
medical treatment decisions.
The Court may not permit Bear River to confuse the "coverage" requirement and
the proof of loss requirement. Certainly, expenses which are "covered" must be
"necessary" in some sense,15 but that begs the question of the nature of the procedural
proof of loss requirement.
In terms of legal principles, this distinction resembles the distinction
between a 'substantive' right, and the 'procedure' by which that right
may be established or enforced. This fundamental distinction
between the loss, in fact, being within coverage, and the manner by
which the insured goes about establishing this to the insurer's
satisfaction, tends to get blurred with unfortunate frequency
Couch on Insurance 3d, §193:19 (emphasis added).
The insured has the substantive right of indemnification for "all expenses" which
are incurred for "necessary" medical treatment. The proof of loss requirement, which
must be substantially complied with16 by the insured, exists as a mechanism to establish
entitlement to the substantive contractual right.
Substantial performance of the insured's obligation does not entail a jury trial, it

15

The Court will consider "each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v.
Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060,1061-62 (Utah 1981).
16

See Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994) ("Professor
Corbin states this rule as follows: * When a contract has been made for an agreed
exchange of two performances, one of which is to be rendered first, the rendition of this
one substantially in full is a constructive condition precedent to the duty of the other party
to render his [or her] part of the exchange.' 3 A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§700, at 309 (I960).").
16

does not entail changing the opinion of Bear River's agent and advocate (i.e., the
insurance doctor), and it does not transform the injured motorist into an insurer of his or
her doctor's practice of medicine in conformity with the post hoc assertions of the
insurance doctor.17 To the contrary, this Court and the legislature have consistently
explained that the no-fault statute was intended to eliminate litigation for the minimal
losses to be paid by the PIP carrier. It is impossible to reconcile the plain statutory
language, this Court's gloss thereon, and the legislature's expressed intent of "no
litigation," on one hand, and Bear River's desire for case-by-case litigation, on the other
hand.
Instead of mandating jury trials for determining the scope of coverage, the proof of
loss requirement is set forth in Section 309(5)(b) and requires that the insured provide
"reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred" (i.e., this answers the
question: How?). After an insured complies with this proof of loss requirement (i.e., the
procedure), he or she is then entitled to receive the substantive right18 of payment of "all
expenses" guaranteed under the contract (i.e., this answers the question: What?), and the
insurer's reciprocal performance of its contractual duties is required within 30 days (i.e.,
this answers the question: When?). The insurer's only defenses are set forth in Section

17

It is not negligence to rely upon the advice of a treating physician. Mikkelsen v.
Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384,1387 (Utah 1988). Moreover, contributory negligence is not a
permissible affirmative defense in a contract action.
18

At the risk of being repetitious, the substantive right is the PIP carrier's payment
of all out-of-pocket expenses (i.e., the risk transferred).
17

309 (i.e., this answers the question: Unless?).
Bear River, properly, only requires the proof of loss procedure set forth in Section
309(5) for initial expenses such as ambulance charges, emergency room charges, and
initial treatments.19 However, whenever Bear River determines that the expenses incurred
by its insureds exceed some arbitrary and undisclosed level, it solicits the second opinion
of an insurance doctor.
The use of an insurance doctor is not part of the proof of loss requirement. Rather,
it is Bear River's unilateral and after-the-fact analysis of the insured's out-of-pocket
expenses under standards extrinsic to the no-fault statute (such as MERCY guidelines).
Bear River's denial of PIP benefits based upon its insurance doctor's disagreement with
the medical decisions of the treating physicians and its insurance doctor's interpretation
of the PIP carrier's legal obligations20 is an "exclusionary" act.
Bear River does not argue that the Plaintiffs failed to do or provide anything. Bear
River does not assert that Plaintiffs did something wrong after the claim arose and the risk

19

This fact gives rise to estoppel issues. When an insurer pays prior similar
claims which reasonably induce insureds to assume that such future damages are to be
reimbursed as PIP benefits and subjected to the same proof, a court may rely upon
equitable estoppel principles to prevent the insurer from denying or discontinuing
payments.
20

See State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App.), cert denied. 923 P.2d 693
(Utah 1996) ("[T]hose portions of the expert witnesses' testimony to which [plaintiff]
objects quite clearly state legal conclusions because the witnesses tie their opinions to the
requirements of Utah law. Thus, [plaintiff] has established error and that this error should
have been obvious to the court.").
18

attached. Instead, Bear River asserts that its unilateral decision to request an insurance
doctor's second opinion permitted it to rest on nothing more substantial than the
inarticulate legal opinions of its insurance doctor and, thereby, to limit its contractual
liability. See United States Fidelitv & Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993)
(explaining that a clause operates as an exclusion if it purports to reduce an insurer's
contractual liability).
In order for Bear River to be permitted to deny or discontinue payment of PIP
benefits based upon the second opinion of its insurance doctors, Bear River must be
endowed with such a right pursuant to a clear and explicit "exclusion, condition or
limitation" in addition to the seven which the legislature has provided in Section 309 (and
which the legislature limited by using the word "only"). It should be obvious that the
word "necessary" contained in the coverage clause cannot be decontextualized and
exported into an exclusionary clause in the absence of legislative action. Nevertheless,
that is exactly what Bear River acknowledges that it does.
Because the physician's treatment decisions are not attributable to the insured,21 if
the treating physician committed fraud or, according to the insurance doctor, made some

21

See Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co.. 963 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1998)
(explaining that "'[i]t would be 'patently unfair' to allow the insurer to avoid its
obligations under the policy on the basis of information that the applicant did not know,
or alternatively, did not fully understand.'") (citations omitted).
19

other "mistake" (in the absence of proof— not speculative fear — of collusion22), such
fraud or mistake cannot constitute the insured's violation of his or her subjective
representation that medical treatments would be "necessary." Therefore, the only
justification for an insurer's denial of PIP benefits or delay of payment beyond 30 days is
a PIP carrier's allegation and proof23 that the insured violated his or her representation by
obtaining medical treatment in bad faith. A second opinion expressed by an insurance
doctor does not have any tendency to show that the insured violated his or her
representation of good faith. On the other hand, a PIP carrier's reliance upon the legal
opinion of an insurance doctor is conclusive proof that the insurer breached its contract
and that it did not investigate, analyze or act rationally (i.e., that it acted in bad faith).
The acknowledgment that "necessary" is not a coverage term (but rather, that it is
a collateral representation, warranty or condition) gives effect to the word and harmonizes
each and every element of the no-fault statute. It is consistent with the ambiguity
principle. It advances the legislative intent that PIP benefits provide prompt and efficient
reimbursement for minimal losses. It does not render the 30-day payment provision

22

Bear River, "by this argument suggests that protecting an insurer from possible .
.. collusion outweighs the legislative mandate to provide mandatory protection for
victims of automobile accidents. We do not agree." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call
712 P.2d231,235-36 (Utah 1985).
23

An insurer who wishes to debate "fairly debatable" arguments is required to
debate them "in court" or lose its affirmative defense. It is not proper to misrepresent the
terms of the contract, issue naked rejections of coverage, employ intimidating claims
practices, and still profess entitlement to a "fair debate."
20

meaningless. It does not render the "proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred"
language meaningless. It acknowledges the professed fears of insurers that they may be
subjected to "fraud" or "bad faith" and does not eliminate those valid defenses. It does
not render the no-fault statute's promise of coverage illusory. And it does not permit
Bear River to receive an unconscionable windfall of millions of dollars per year.
III.

BEAR RIVER'S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY PLAINTIFFS WAS
TRIGGERED AT THE TIME IT LEARNED THAT EXPENSES
HAD BEEN "INCURRED."

The level of proof necessary to demonstrate an insured's entitlement to receive PIP
benefits is "reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the
period."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 31 A-22-309(5)(b). This Court must note that the insured is

not required to prove that the expenses were "related to" the covered accident or that the
expenses incurred were also "reasonable and necessary." The legislature omitted these
terms advisedly. Requiring preponderance-of-the-evidence-type-proof of "causation" or
"reasonableness and necessity" to determine the amount of PIP benefits to which an
insured is entitled would defy the policy purposes of the no-fault statute which is .
"prompt" and "efficient" payment of PIP benefits on a "monthly [basis] so that claimants
can continue to meet basic living expenses." Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos., 842
P.2d 865 (Utah 1992). An insurance system partially supplanted24 the common law tort

24

Utah's no-fault statute has been described as a "partial tort exemption" statute
while other states have adopted "true no-fault" and still others have adopted "add-on"
statutes. These fundamental distinctions are lost on Bear River which initiated its
21

system. This insurance system is designed to partially avoid25 the costs and difficulties
inherent in the tort system26 and to direct scarce resources toward healing injured
motorists rather than paying scarce funds to lawyers and insurance doctors.
The trigger for PIP coverage is most analogous to "litigation coverage"27 or what is
frequently referred to as the duty to defend. Neither coverage creates an adversarial

"medical management" techniques nationwide with reference to its potential windfall
rather than investigating the requirements of the different statutes in different states.
25

The no-fault statute provides partial tort immunity subject to the no-fault
threshold. This is not unlike previous versions of the workers' compensation act. See
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983)
(explaining that the parties' competing interests were balanced by the legislative
enactment of a two-tiered payment system requiring a "definite limitation of $1,283.38 as
the maximum award for any 'ordinary' case" and "vests the commission with continuing
supervision and control, which can be invoked as either party may find it necessary, to
make determinations as to the causal relationship, necessity, reasonableness and justice
of any extended award."). Under the no-fault statute, by contrast, the legislature left tort
law to deal with "extended awards" and created PIP benefits to deal with "ordinary"
cases.
26

PIP coverage "is based upon contract rather than tort principles." King v.
Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1993) (quoting In re Spera, 713 P.2d 1155,
1156 (Wyo. 1986) (interpreting the workers' compensation act)).
Under contract principles the [insured motorist] should not be
denied benefits unless a provision in the statutory contract
between the [insured motorist], the state, and the [PIP carrier]
explicitly suspends the benefits.
Id; see also Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985) ("Public
policy requires that persons purchasing [no-fault] policies are entitled to be informed, in
writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially exclusionary terms.").
27

Liability coverage and litigation coverage are usually lumped together for
purposes of assessing premiums, but they are analytically distinct coverages.
22

relationship; instead, they are geared toward serving the insured.28 The duty to defend
requires the insurer to pay attorneys enormous sums of money on behalf of its insured
"even if the allegations in a suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent." Deseret Fed. Sav.
& Loan Assoc, v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986).
In other words, the trigger is the filing of a lawsuit by an adversary against the insured.
The liability carrier's defense obligation is triggered by the whim of the enemy. In
contrast, the PIP carrier's obligations are triggered by the treatments and medical
decisions of a physician who (like the PIP carrier itself) owes the highest duties good
faith29 to the injured insured.
Of course, a liability carrier may not obtain an Independent Legal Examination

28

The flow of the benefits would lead most people to agree that the duty to defend
is a "first-party" coverage and liability coverage is a "third-party" coverage. Bad faith in
connection both types of coverage is undoubtedly "third-party" bad faith. This is true
even though both types of coverage arise out of "first-party" contracts (otherwise the duty
of good faith and fair dealing does not exist). PIP coverage possesses elements of "firstparty" coverage and "third-party" coverage. Its overall structure gives rise to a cause of
action against the other party to the "first-party" contract for "third-party" bad faith.
29

Justice Cardozo's famous statement is relevant at this point: "Many forms of
conduct permissible in a work-a-day world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden
to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending
and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of
particular circumstances. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a
level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by a
judgment of this court." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
23

("I.L.E.")30 from some shill-with-a-law-degree who obediently determines that the
claimant's allegations are invalid and, thereby, escape its duty to defend. This is true
because the insurer "stands in the shoes" of the insured. This is also true because
timeliness is the essence of the bargain between the parties. A PIP carrier's obligations
are similarly unaffected by predictable opinions peddled by insurance doctors.
The purpose of litigation coverage is to provide legal representation when it is
needed in order to avoid default. The essence of PIP coverage is also timeliness.31 The
PIP carrier "stands in the shoes" of the insured and must pay the expenses incurred by the
insured and owed to third parties.32 PIP benefits are intended to provide compensation to
insureds "when they need it." Couch on Insurance 3d, §125:1 (explaining that no-fault
systems were adopted nationwide because although the tort system is capable of
providing compensation,33 it is incapable of providing timely compensation).
30

"A person cannot avoid liability for the non-performance of its obligations by
placing such performance beyond his control by his own voluntary act." Cannon v.
Stevens School of Business. Inc.. 560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977).
31

See Versluis v. Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992) ("PIP
benefits are intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses
and actual loss of earnings incurred as a result of an accident without having to bring a
lawsuit. Unlike an award of damages based on negligence, PIP disability benefits are
paid monthly so that claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses.")
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
32

For these reasons, among others, the relationship between a PIP carrier and its
insured is based upon trust and is fiduciary in nature. Were it not so, the absurd
procedure pursued by Pennington against his treating physicians would be proper.
33

Bear River appears to believe that PIP benefits are "damages." PIP benefits are
not "damages." See Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980)
24

Utah's no-fault statute requires that "all expenses" be paid within thirty (30) days
of receiving "reasonable proof of... expenses incurred." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31 A-22-309(5). Bear River ignores the 30-day period rendering it of no effect. A
prominent commentator on insurance law has described the "reasonable proof standard
in connection with the 30-day payment requirement:
Where a statute requires payment within 30 days after receipt of
reasonable proof of loss and amount of expenses, it has been held
that an automobile insurer could not require an insured to submit all
supporting medical records before the 30-day time period for
payment of personal injury protection benefits began to run by where
defining "reasonable proof of claim" to include all supporting
medical records would allow the insurer to have unilateral power
to determine reasonable proof of loss thereby circumventing the
insurer's obligation to pay within 30 days and obliterating the
period.
Couch on Insurance 3d § 189:64 at pp. 189-75, 76. Bear River may not "obliterate" the
legislative intent underlying the no-fault statute by hiring insurance doctors and chanting
the incomprehensible phrase "reasonable and necessary."

(explaining that "the compensation provided for in the [workers' compensation] act is in
no sense to be considered as damages for the injured employee" rather it "arises out of the
relation existing between employer and employee."). However, it is much easier to
collect damages than it would be to collect PIP benefits under Bear River's so-called
"reasonable and necessary" test. See Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel Co.. 709 P.2d 330, 334 (Utah 1985); Promax Dev. Corp. v. Maxon. 943 P.2d 247
(Utah App. 1997) (explaining that, because it is the wrongdoer rather than the injured
party who should bear the burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages, the
standard for determining the amount of damages is not so exacting as the standard for
proving the fact of damages. Rather, to prove the amount of damages, the evidence must
rise above speculation and provide a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise,
estimate of damages).
25

IV.

BEAR RIVER BREACHED ITS CONTRACT BY REFUSING TO
PROVIDE PIP BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF WHEN DUE.

Judge Thome originally ruled that Plaintiffs claim for breach of contract was "a
question of fact" and denied Plaintiffs motion.34 (R. 189). He based this ruling on Bear
River's assertion that a jury needed to determine whether expenses were "reasonable and
necessary" because it obtained the second opinion from its insurance doctor, and that
Plaintiff bore the burden of proof.35 (R. 191). While Judge Dever failed to provide any
legal terminology when ordering the Judgment entered against Bear River, his conclusion
that Plaintiff was entitled to costs, interest, and attorney fees plainly implies that he found
that Bear River breached its contract by not paying PIP benefits when due. (R. 528).
This Court must first affirm Judge Dever's finding that Bear River breached its
contract.36 Judge Thome's Order found that there was a contract, that Plaintiff performed,
34

In the Order prepared by Bear River's counsel denying Plaintiffs motion for
partial summary judgment dated April 1,1998, it is acknowledged that Plaintiff moved
for a summary judgment that Bear River's refusal to pay PIP benefits when due
constituted "breach of contract." (R. 190). However, Bear River's counsel later claimed
that Plaintiff had "done nothing to pursue its [sic] cause of action for breach of contract in
the present case." (R. 247). The court adopted the misrepresentation of Bear River's
counsel. (R. 268).
35

If Plaintiff bore the burden of proof, such burden would be imposed by a clause
in the nature of a condition precedent. But see S&G. Inc. v. Intermountain Power
Agency. 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996) ("S&G's argument does not withstand scrutiny. The
change order could not have created a condition precedent to a claim that had accrued ten
months earlier."); Hertz v. Nordic Ltd. Inc.. 761 P.2d 959, 963 (Utah App. 1988) (stating
"no one can avail himself of the non-performance of a condition precedent, who has
himself occasioned its non-performance").
36

"The elements of a prima facie case for breach of contract are (1) a contract, (2)
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of the contract by the other party,
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that Bear River refused to perform, and that Plaintiff suffered damages. (R. 190). It
found, however, that Bear River's non-performance was not a "breach" because it was
justified by its insurance doctor's opinion. Id. However, because Bear River's nonperformance was not justified by its bare reliance on the inadmissible37 legal opinion of
the insurance doctor where no statutory provision provides for such non-performance,
Bear River's refusal to pay within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of the fact and
amount of expenses incurred was the breach of its contract. Judge Thome's Order must
be reversed.
V.

BEAR RIVER FAILED TO PLEAD THE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE OF "FAIRLY DEBATABLE."

Defendant argued, and Judge Thome ruled, that Bear River's refusal to pay Mr.

and (4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 UT 20, f 10,416 Utah Adv. Rep. 5.
37

Bear River's unflinching assertions relating to the opinion of its insurance
doctor resemble parol evidence. "This court has held that as a principle of contract
interpretation, the parol evidence rule has only a narrow application. Hall v. Process
Instruments & Control 890 P.2d 1024,1026 (Utah 1995) (citing Union Bank v. Swenson.
707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985)). Simply stated, the rule operates, in the absence of
invalidating causes such as fraud or illegality, to exclude evidence of prior or
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract. Hall. 890 P.2d at 1026. Of
course, "no parol evidence that is offered can be said to vary or contradict a writing until
by process of interpretation it is determined what the writing means." 3 Arthur L. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts § 579, at 412 (1960) [hereinafter Corbin ]. Accordingly, we have
held that a court may consider extrinsic evidence if the meaning of the contract is
ambiguous or uncertain. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104,108 (Utah 1991) (citing
Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292,1293 (Utah 1983)): see also Hall 890 P.2d at
1026-27 (citing Colonial Leasing Co. of New England. Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr.. 731
P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986))." Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah
1995).
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Prince's PIP benefits within 30 days of receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount
of expenses incurred was "fairly debatable," thus a bad-faith cause of action did not lie.
(R. 192). Pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an affirmative
defense includes any matter "constituting an avoidance." Defendant asserts that its
"fairly debatable" defense suggests "new and independent reason[s] why [Mr. Prince]
may not assert a claim." Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693,
695 (Utah App. 1989). Bear River did not plead its "fairly debatable" affirmative
defense. (R. 11-18).
A party may not present an affirmative defense for the first time on a motion. See
Creekview Apts. 771 P.2d at 694. Defendant's assertion that it owed only a "fairly
debatable" duty to provide PIP benefits to Mr. Prince is an affirmative defense. All
affirmative defenses must be raised in pleadings. Pleadings "necessarily exclude
motions." Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon. 770 P.2d 1009,1010 (Utah App. 1989).
Therefore, Judge Thome's adoption of Bear River's conclusion that its conduct was
"fairly debatable" must be reversed because it was waived by not being pled.
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VI.

BEAR RIVER'S FAILURE TO PAY PLAINTIFF'S PIP
BENEFITS BASED UPON NOTHING MORE THAN THE
INSURANCE DOCTOR'S OPINION VIOLATED ITS DUTY OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.

Bear River refused to provide PIP benefits to Plaintiff based upon its insurance
doctor's assertions that more than 12 weeks of treatment was not "medically necessary."
(R. 190). Bear River also admitted that it refused to provide PIP benefits because it
feared that the tortfeasor's insurer would not reimburse it pursuant to Section 309(6) for
more than the amounts recommended by the insurance doctor. (R. 71). Bear River also
asserted that if it paid all of Plaintiff s PIP benefits, his premiums would go up. (R. 71).
The general rule of strict enforcement of duties of good faith and fair dealing was
adopted in Beck when the Utah Supreme Court stated: "the state of mind of the insurer is
irrelevant; even an inadvertent breach of the covenant of good faith implied in an
insurance contract can substantially harm the insured and warrants a remedy." Beck v.
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). Therefore, Bear River's mere
assertion that it really, really, really believed that it could rely on the insurance doctor
does not transform its ignorance into good faith or render its bad faith "fairly debatable."
The Court has adopted the fairly debatable defense. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins.
Co.. 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996) (holding that the covenant of good faith imposes the
requirement "that insurers act reasonably, as an objective matter, in dealing with their
insureds."). In Billings, the Utah Supreme Court held that the fairly debatable defense
allows the insurer to present evidence that it dealt with its insured in an objectively
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reasonable manner. Id. at n.2.
Bear River has failed to present any such evidence. Instead it presented the second
opinion of the insurance doctor and exclaimed "accordingly" Bear River discontinued
payment. (R. 148). Instead of analyzing its right to exclusively rely on its insurance
doctor for a coverage opinion (i.e., a legal opinion), Bear River simply asserted the "fact"
that its insurance doctor's second opinion gave it a "clear debatable reason for denial of
plaintiff s benefits." (R. 148). But see State v. Tennev. 913 P.2d 750. 756 (Utah App.).
cert, denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996) ("[T]hose portions of the expert witnesses'
testimony to which [plaintiff] objects quite clearly state legal conclusions because the
witnesses tie their opinions to the requirements of Utah law. Thus, [plaintiff] has
established error and that this error should have been obvious to the court.").

1.

Defendant's Conduct Did Not Satisfy the Beck At-The-Very-Least Test.

Defendant concluded (without analysis or evidence) that "evidence establishes"
that it properly discharged its contractual obligations under the Beck at-the-very-least test
which it quotes. (R. 145).
The implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at
the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to
enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in
rejecting or settling the claim.
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added); see also
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996) (quoting same
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language and inserting similar emphasis).
The fairly debatable defense allows Defendant to attempt to persuade the fact
finder that its conduct was objectively reasonable. In its attempt to so persuade, Bear
River instead simply concluded its conduct was reasonable. (R. 145-148). Then it quoted
from the report of its insurance doctor. Id. Both the assertion of a conclusion and the
recitation of an inadmissible opinion are insufficient to satisfy the "fairly debatable"
defense.
It is undisputed that Mr. Prince's claim was valid. Neither Defendant nor its
doctor has disputed that Mr. Prince's claim was "valid," it only argued that the expenses
were not "reasonable and necessary" because its doctor labeled certain treatments as "not
medically necessary." This Court will not interpret the no-fault statute's use of the
commonly-understood term "necessary" to limit PIP benefits based upon the supercilious
use of the term "medically necessary" by Defendant's insurance doctor. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 68-3-11 ("Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language . . . .")
Moreover, Defendant's investigation was not "diligent." It cut off Mr. Prince's
PIP benefits retroactively long after the out-of-pocket expenses were incurred, and it
scolded Mr. Prince for continuing his doctor-ordered treatments instead of waiting for the
results and interpretation of its doctor's report. (R. 55). Defendant did not act
"reasonably" by relying on its insurance doctor's legal opinion to the exclusion of all
other evidence, or by making its coverage decision based upon the feared assertions to be
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made by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. Defendant did not act reasonably by
threatening that Mr. Prince's premiums would go up if it paid the sums that it had
promised to pay. Defendant did not "fairly evaluate" Mr. Prince's claim when it ignored
the unambiguous requirements of the no-fault statute. It did not act "reasonably" in
refusing understand its obligations and refusing to read the plain language of the no-fault
statute. And its refusal to pay Plaintiffs PIP benefits for several years when its actions
were required within 30 days was hardly "prompt" compliance with the contract.
Judge Thome's conclusion that Bear River's actions were "fairly debatable" as a
matter of law must be reversed. Bear River's actions constituted the breach of its duties
of good faith and fair dealing, as a matter of law. It misrepresented its obligations and the
insured's rights, it failed to fairly evaluate the facts. It failed to act promptly or
reasonably. And its bad faith continued through this litigation by and through the
assertions made by its attorneys.
VII.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PIP CARRIER AND ITS
INSUREDS IS A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP GIVING
RISE TO FIDUCIARY DUTIES WHICH GIVES RISE TO A
CLAIM FOR THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH.

"The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the principle of inequality
between the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties
over the other." Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965). Bear River
promised to pay to medical providers "all expenses" incurred by the insured for medical
treatment subject only to the coverage limits purchased and the "reasonable value" of the
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expenses.
Bear River expressly promised to defend Plaintiff for its decision to refuse to
provide PIP benefits to him. (R. 112 at f 5). In addition to the fact that Plaintiffs PIP
coverage included Bear River's duty to defend, PIP coverage, like the duty to defend, is
effectively a part of liability coverage.
While no-fault coverages are, in fact, first-party benefits payable to
the injured party by his or her own insurance company, this
insurance clearly is intended to replace or augment automobile
liability insurance....
Couch on Insurance 3d, § 125:2. Therefore, Bear River's mere assertion that PIP benefits
(like the duty to defend) are generally in the nature of first-party coverage fails to shed
any light on the question of whether its bad faith in connection with refusing to pay PIP
benefits gives rise to third-party bad faith.38
While Bear River insisted that its insurance doctor's "medical decisions" create its
right to review medical questions; in point of fact, this case does not raise "medical"
issues at all — it raises "contractual" issues. Although Plaintiffs' injuries are the
offspring of automobile accidents (which prior to the adoption of the no-fault statute
would have implied the utilization of Bear River's tort-based analysis), this fact does not

38

This Court's decision in Beck was explained in detail in subsequent cases
involving wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Based upon the Court's
reasoning in those cases, Plaintiffs complaint phrased part of its allegation of third-party
bad faith (5th cause of action) as "Tort of Violation of Public Policy Embodied in the Nofault Insurance Act" in order to avoid the confusion surrounding the terms "first-party"
and "third-party" in addition to a generalized allegation of bad faith (2nd cause of action).
Unfortunately, the naive attempt to avoid confusion actually spawned greater confusion.
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permit Bear River to impose its "brain children"39 on its insureds.
Bear River implemented an undisclosed medical cost containment program (the
purpose of which is to provide an annual windfall to Bear River measured in millions of
dollars) in lieu of honoring its promise to indemnify its insureds for their expenses. Bear
River presented its doctor's arguments as "independent" medical opinions. Its use of this
misleading nomenclature leads average purchasers of insurance to believe that the
insurance doctor is the equivalent of their doctor (or, at least, insureds do not understand
that the insurance doctor is contractually obligated to help the insurance company save
money and does not perform any "medical" role at all). Plaintiffs do not allege complete
silence, but half-truths and concealment.40 Bear River's failure to disclose its cost
containment programs, to disclose the meaning, if any, of its "reasonable and necessary"
slogan, or to explicitly warn its insureds that it would substitute its doctors' opinions41 for
the opinions of the insureds' treating doctors as the sole basis for its denial of the
insureds' claims violated Plaintiffs' trust and reliance on Defendant's perceived special
39

Andrew v. Ideal National Ins. Co.. 509 P.2d 367 (Utah 1973) (acknowledging,
sarcastically, that unilateral self-serving conclusions made by one party to a contract to
determine the terms and conditions thereof would be a "good, economic business
practice, if possible and enforceable").
40

For example, Bear River's insurance doctors are "independent" of their
physician-patient duties and their hippocratic oaths. Bear River's characterization is not
wholly false, just incredibly misleading.
41

See Beaver County v. Home Indem. Co.. 52 P.2d 435 (Utah 1935) ("a trustee,
whether public officer, receiver, guardian, or other fiduciary, who contracts to surrender
his control to another [such as an insurance doctor], has made a promise contrary to
public policy") (citations omitted).
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knowledge42 of the insurance industry.
Bear River is also Plaintiffs' agent and owes fiduciary duties43 to them with respect
to PIP coverage.
Wholly apart from the contractual obligations undertaken by the
parties, the law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary obligation to
their principals with respect to matters falling within the scope of
their agency.
Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985) (citations
omitted) (analyzing Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 430 P.2d 576 (Utah
1967)). Bear River was obligated to pay the third-party medical providers directly.44
And, of course, an agent such as Bear River may not enrich itself at the expense of its

42

Bear River argued that Plaintiff had "no standing" to sue Bear River for bad
faith. (R. 97). "Standing" has absolutely nothing to do with this case. Bear River's
assertion is appalling.
43

The district court and Bear River were both confused by the "first-party" and
"third-party" nomenclature as used by this Court in its bad-faith jurisprudence. Bear
River asserted that insurers are "accordingly" only liable for "first-party" bad faith
because PIP coverage is "first-party" coverage. (R. 97-98). Bad faith denial of PIP
claims is "third-party" bad faith arising from a first-party contract (the duty of good faith
and fair dealing only exists between parties to a contract — i.e., it does not extend to
third-party claimants). See, e^g., Pixton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 809 P.2d 746
(Utah App. 1991). The "third-party" bad faith distinction relates to the obligations owed
by the insured (i.e., the insurer which "steps in the shoes" of the insured and is obligated
to indemnify the insured) to third-parties (such as medical providers) because the
insurer's obligation is to protect its insured from claims made against the insured by thirdparties and because PIP coverage gives rise to a confidential relationship. Liability
coverage (a first-party contract, but third-party coverage) and litigation coverage (a firstparty contract and first-party coverage) are the two types of coverage acknowledged to
give rise to a "third-party" bad faith claim. PIP coverage is the third.
44

PIP medical expenses are almost always paid directly to the medical providers.
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principals, such as the members of the proposed Class, or fail to disclose the standards
underlying the non-performance of its duties. This is not a new concept:
"The employee is duty bound not to act in antagonism or opposition
to the interests of the employer. Everyone-whether designated
agent, trustee, servant, or what not — who is under contract or other
legal obligation to represent or act for another in any particular
business or line of business or for any valuable purpose must be
loyal and faithful to the interest of such other in respect to such
business or purpose. He cannot lawfully serve or acquire any
private interest of his own in opposition to it. This is a rule of
common sense and honesty as well as of law. The agent is not
entitled to avail himself of any advantage that his position may give
him to profit beyond the agreed compensation for his services. He
may not speculate for his gain in the subject-matter of the
employment. He may not use information that he may have acquired
by reason of his employment either for the purpose of acquiring
property or doing any other act which is in opposition to his
principal's interests. He will be required to account to his
employer or principal for any gift, gratuity, or benefit received
by him in violation of his duty, or any interest acquired adverse
to his principal without a full disclosure, though it does not appear
that the principal has suffered any actual loss by fraud or otherwise."
Tatsuno v. Kasai. 259 P. 318 (Utah 1927) (quoting 21 R. C. L. p. 825, under the title
"Principal and Agent," § 10) (emphasis added). Rather than encouraging Bear River to
impose a second injury on its insureds, the Court should provide it with "every incentive
to treat the insured properly in the first instance." Campbell v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co.. 840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992).
Bear River's breach of its duties of good faith and fair dealing arising from a PIP
contract subjects it to third-party bad faith. Judge Thome's Order must be reversed.
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VIII. BEAR RIVER IS PRESUMED TO HAVE COMMITTED FRAUD,
AND ITS UNSUPPORTED "NO EVIDENCE" MOTION WAS
FRIVOLOUS.
Fiduciaries who breach their obligations or fail to disclose their misconduct to their
beneficiaries are presumed to have committed fraud: "If the representations were untrue
and known to be untrue [or recklessly not recognized as being untrue], the fraudulent
intent is presumed." Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n.. 75 P.2d
669 (Utah 1938). "Where representations have been made in regard to a material matter
and action has been taken, in the absence of evidence showing the contrary, it will be
presumed that representations were relied upon." Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n
Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983).
After careful study and consideration we conclude that this
presumption shifts the burden onto the confidential adviser of
persuading or convincing the fact finder by a preponderance of the
evidence that no fraud or undue influence was exerted, or in other
words, he has the burden of convincing the fact finder from the
evidence that it is more probable that he acted perfectly fair with
his confidant; that he made complete disclosure of all material
information available and took no unfair advantage of his superior
position than that he exerted fraud or undue influence to obtain the
benefits in question.
Hendee v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.. 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1956). As a fiduciary that
asserts its right to look after its own financial well-being at the expense of its insureds,
Bear River bears the burden of persuasion, and the Court has a duty to reign in the
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industry's mischief.45
Bear River recited the nine elements of fraud, and baldly proclaimed that Plaintiff
failed to plead fraud with particularity. (R. 150). Defendant failed to demonstrate (or
even assert) which factor of fraud it believed was missing, or to otherwise explain how
Mr. Prince's Complaint was "accordingly" deficient.
Instead, Defendant baldly asserted in its reply memorandum46 that it did not have
any evidence that Mr. Prince relied on Defendant's fraud or that he was injured by such
reliance. (R. 171). Bear River had no evidence of its own misconduct because it
intentionally closed its eyes,47 and it had no evidence of reliance because it refused to
conduct any discovery. Placing the burden of proof on the non-moving party would
effectively treat Rule 56 as a discovery technique. But see. Union Bank v. Swenson. 707
P.2d 663, 668 (Utah 1985) ("The functions of issue-formation and fact-revelation are
appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process."). Judge Thome ignored the plain
45

"And then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as
shall suppress the mischief, advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle invention and
evasions for continuance of the mischief,... and to add force and life to the cure and
remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the a c t . . . . " Masich v. United
States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612 (1948) (citation omitted).
46

A party may not attempt to support conclusory assertions made in the opening
argument by presenting marginally better assertions in a reply memorandum. See U.P.C..
Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen.. Inc.. 1999 UT App 303,ffif62-64, 990 P.2d 945.
47

Bear River's confidential relationship with its insureds required it to refrain
from "the deliberate desire to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that inquiry
would disclose a vice or defect in the transaction, — that is to say, where there is an
intentional closing of the eyes or stopping of the ears." Research Planning Inc. v. Bank of
Utah. 690 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1984).
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language of Rule 56 and every opinion ever written by this Court. Instead of obeying the
law, the district court adopted Bear River's mere assertion that Plaintiff "failed to supply .
.. evidence . . . of fraud" in response to Bear River's "no evidence" motion. (R. 172).
The assertion that a defendant may make an unsupported motion for summary
judgment early in litigation and thereby force the plaintiff to present all facts and legal
arguments necessary to prove his case or else have the allegations dismissed is absolutely
foolish and asinine. It is true that, where a party submits a properly supported motion, the
opponent to a summary judgment motion must "set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
However, that burden is triggered only when "a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in" Rule 56(e). Id. (emphasis added). "Unless the
moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine
issue of material fact exists, 'the party opposing the motion is under no obligation to
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433,445
(Utah 1996) (quoting K&T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994) (emphasis
added)).
The foregoing rule is implicit in and compelled by the language of Rule 56:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added); see also Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869
P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) ("The party moving for summary judgment must establish a
right to judgment based on the applicable law as applied to an undisputed material issue
of fact").
A party that chooses to file an unsupported motion for summary judgment may not
impose any burdens on the responding party. In response to an unsupported motion, the
non-moving party may rely on his pleadings and "is under no obligation to demonstrate
that there is a genuine issue for trial." K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah
1994) (citing Rule 56(e) and Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah
1994)); see also Gadd v. Olson. 685 P.2d 1041,1045 (Utah 1984); Parrish v. Lavton City
Corp.. 542 P.2d 1086,1087 (Utah 1975).
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that:
If the [requirements of the rules] are not fulfilled, both in letter and
spirit, the summary judgment procedure may become a vehicle of
injustice rather than a salutary medium of reaching a swift but just
result on a pure matter of law, as intended by the framers of the
rules.
Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993) (quoting Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Foster. 93 So. 2d 112,114 (Fla. 1957)).
A party may never file a motion for summary judgment based upon the mere
assertion that there is "no evidence" to support the opposing position and thereby shift the
burden of persuasion to the non-moving party. Parties filing such frivolous "no evidence"
motions generally rely upon the United States Supreme Court's decision known as
40

Celotex (which does not support the concept of a "no evidence" motion) which is not
binding on this Court. Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433 at n. 13 (Utah 1996) ("This court
has not previously adopted the reasoning of the majority opinion in Celotex, which is not
binding on us as a matter of law, and declines to do so today."); see also Langeland v.
Monarch Motors. Inc.. 952 P.2d 1058 at n. 4 (Utah 1998) ("While federal cases are
instructive, and perhaps even persuasive, they are by no means authoritative and certainly
not controlling.").
To summarize: First, "[inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment." D & L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah
1989). Second, unless the moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, "the party opposing the motion
is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." K&T. Inc. v.
Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
[0]nce the moving party has brought forth evidence either tending to
prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging the
existence of one of the elements of the cause of action, the
nonmoving party then bears the burden of 'providing] some
evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the essential
elements of his [or her] claim.'
Jensen v. IHC Hosps.. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (quoting Thavne v. Beneficial
Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120,124 (Utah 1994)) (emphasis added).
However, before determining whether the nonmoving party has met
its burden, the court hearing the motion for summary judgment must
be satisfied that the moving party has met its burden of proving that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
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party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(e).
Connor v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 972 P.2d 414 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added).
Third, "'[a] single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact.'" See Apache
Tank Lines. Inc. v. Cheney. 706 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (quoting
Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170,1172 (Utah 1983)). Fourth, summary judgment
procedure is a drastic remedy, requiring strict compliance with the rule authorizing it.
Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993). Fifth, in cases involving the
interpretation of a document or an agreement, "it is not appropriate for a court to weigh
disputed evidence concerning such factors; the sole inquiry to be determined is whether
there is a material issue of fact to be decided.... It is of no moment that the evidence on
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling,... documentary evidence is not
dispositive if the intent and purpose underlying the documents are at issue." W. M.
Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co.. 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981).
Bear River and Judge Thome grossly distorted Rule 56. Judge Thome's Order
must be reversed.

IX.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WERE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED.

Bear River moved for a summary judgment based on vouching for its own
arguments. (R. 149). Bear River's boot-strapping conclusions that "reasonable and
necessary" is a "recognized standard" did not entitle it to a summary judgment.
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Based on nothing more substantial than the inarticulate legal opinion of its
insurance doctor, Bear River concluded (without reasoning) that "[tjhere is no evidence
whatsoever that Bear River's conduct could be considered outrageous." (R. 149).
Imposing "standards" which are not set forth in the contract, imposing "standards" which
are not authorized by the no-fault statute, relying on an "independent" doctor to the
exclusion of all other facts, acting as a fiduciary who puts its own interests ahead of the
interests of its beneficiary are "outrageous" actions. Bear River's mere assertion to the
contrary did not entitle it to a summary judgment. Judge Thome's Order must be
reversed.
X.

JUDGE DEVER ERRED BY REFUSING TO OVERTURN JUDGE
THORNE'S ORDER.

While it is true that Judge Dever had broad discretion in connection with his
refusal to overturn Judge Thome's Order, it is also true that a judge's primary obligation
is to find the truth. Rule 54(b) allows "a [trial] court to change its position with respect to
any order or decision before a final judgment has been rendered in the case." Trembly v.
Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306,1310 n.2 (Utah App. 1994): accord Timm v.
Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 1993) (explaining that appellate courts "will not
disturb [the trial court's] ruling absent an abuse of discretion.").
It is axiomatic that the trial courts have no discretion to re-write a statute to make it
conform to a party's desires; rather the court must interpret the statute as written. Judge
Thome, as explained in more detail above, refused to give effect to the plain language of
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the no-fault statute. This Court will review that Order for correctness.
Judge Dever's refusal to reverse that ruling, on the other hand, was an abuse of his
discretion. A judge's discretion cannot be used in contravention of the ends of justice.
Justice demands proper interpretation of statutes especially where a party's substantial
rights would be extinguished by the rote adherence to a prior judge's erroneous Order.
Moreover, justice requires speedy and inexpensive determinations of legal questions, and
forcing the Plaintiff to appeal Judge Thome's decision before obtaining relief from his
Order unnecessarily delayed Plaintiffs right of relief. See, e.g.. Utah R. Civ. P. 1.

XL

JUDGE DEVER ERRED BY REFUSING TO PERMIT
PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT.

Rule 15 directs that "leave shall be freely given" to a party to amend its pleading
"when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). In this case, justice required that leave
be given to amend Plaintiffs complaint to add Dr. Marble as a defendant because, he is
an indispensable party. Utah R. Civ. P. 19 (stating that "the court shall order" that
indispensable parties be joined). The only bases upon which "[ajppellate courts uphold a
trial court's denial of a motion to amend [are] if the amendment is sought late in the
course of litigation, if the movant was aware of the facts underlying the proposed
amendment long before its filing, and if there is no adequate explanation for the delay."
Swift Stop. Inc. v. Wight. 845 P.2d 250,253 (Utah App. 1992) (emphasis added). While
Plaintiffs motion was filed late in the course of the original litigation, and many of the
facts were known, Plaintiff did provide an adequate explanation for the delay. (R. 418).
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Bear River constantly misrepresented the facts and the law, and approximately six
different district court judges (in other cases) all refused to interpret the no-fault statute
because the sums at issue were so small and because the courts believed that Bear River's
assertions were consistent with the status quo.** Moreover, Judge Thome's conclusion
that an insurance doctor's legal conclusion creates a question of fact that can only be
resolved by a jury creates an impossible and uneconomic hurdle for any insured who is
denied PIP benefits. These procedural49 and substantive50 facts were sufficient to explain
the delay. Because there was sufficient explanation, Judge Dever's denial of Plaintiff s
motion to amend was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.

48

District court judges have frequently complained that since the amounts at issue
are so small, the cases should be filed in small claims court. If there were any real judge
who would interpret the no-fault statute, the parties could know their obligations and the
burdens of proof. Until that happens, litigation in front of real judges is plenty frustrating
because the status quo is elevated over the plain language of the statute. Subjecting
litigants to small claims court and its part-time volunteers (usually transactional
attorneys) without any guidelines would be a complete mockery of justice.
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Bear River made the ridiculous assertion that Plaintiff was trying to "revive the
dismissed causes of action" through the amendment of the complaint. (R. 392). Causes
of action cannot be "revived" through an amendment. Plaintiff sought to have Judge
Thome's Order reversed through its motion for a new trial, and the revised pleading
would merely expand the scope of the litigation to properly ensure that the victims of
Bear River's insurance fraud and criminal theft can eventually be made whole. See UTAH
CODE ANN. §76-6-521.
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The opinion from the Third Circuit offered additional support for the
propositions being pursued by Plaintiff. See Sullivan v. Barnett 139 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir.
1998).
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XII.

JUDGE DEVER'S REFUSAL TO AWARD REASONABLE
ATTORNEY FEES WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Bear River's counsel repeatedly misrepresented procedural and substantive facts to
the district court regarding the nature and amount of effort expended for the breach of
contract cause of action. The district court apparently relied upon the misstatements
submitted by Bear River's counsel. (R. 268). The district court failed to issue findings of
fact and conclusions of law, hold an evidentiary hearing, or provide any additional
explanation for its conclusion. (R. 527).
Therefore, Plaintiff is under no burden to marshal evidence in support of the
court's ruling. Anderson v. Poms. 1999 UT App 207,110, 984 P.2d 392. Moreover, the
only "fact" that is supportive of what appears to have been Judge Dever's reasoning was
Bear River's misrepresentation that the efforts exerted in connection with the breach of
contract claim only consisted of filing the complaint. Therefore, the basis of Judge
Dever's ruling is hardly composed of "facts" which must be marshaled.
Bear River's counsel repeatedly insisted that the only effort expended by
Plaintiffs counsel for the breach of contract issue was filing the complaint. See, e,g., (R.
230, 247, 276-79, 510). Based upon this bald and incorrect assertion, the district court
limited the award of attorney fees to three hours. (R. 526). Bear River never did explain
how the debate as to the scope of its contractual obligations did not relate to its breach of
contract; instead, thisfrivolousassertion, like nearly every argument ever made by Bear
River and its counsel, was simply asserted. (R. 268).
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Plaintiff repeatedly asked Judge Thorne and Judge Dever to interpret the statutory
contract. As explained above, the determination of whether a party breached a contract
cannot be determined until it is determined what the contract says. This seems too
obvious to admit of serious controversy.
Plaintiff repeatedly asked the court to determine the scope of coverage and the
procedures giving rise to the substantive right of reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses. Bear River's mere assertion that interpreting a contract has nothing to do with
determining the question of a breach of contract can only be characterized as
incompetent, misleading and frivolous.
The terms of the contract determine the rights and obligations of the parties. The
district court refused to interpret the contract, and permitted itself to be misled by Bear
River's attorneys.51 Moreover, all efforts expended to counter the bald assertions of Bear
River's counsel is also grounds for recovering attorney fees. See Lieber v. ITT Hartford
Insurance Ctr.. 2000 UT 90,119, 15 P.3d 1030 ("an insurer is obliged to assess the
black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the claim arises, and to act accordingly. This
obligation to properly assess the law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel
make in litigation.").
Plaintiffs counsel submitted an affidavit for attorney fees which only addressed

51

In an apparent attempt to distract the court from their misconduct, Bear River's
attorneys took the extraordinary step of attempting to intimidate Plaintiffs attorney by
filing an equally-frivolous Rule 11 motion which the trial court, properly, ignored.
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the attorney fees expended up to the point of Judge Thome's Order.52 This affidavit was
not opposed by any competent reasoning or any competent counter-affidavit. See Freed
Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co.. 537 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Utah 1975) (attorney fees may be
awarded on summary judgment if the record contains a stipulation, an unrebutted
affidavit, or evidence supporting the reasonableness of the award); South Sanpitch Co. v.
Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988) (uncontroverted testimony concerning amount of
reasonable fee provides adequate basis for fee award). Therefore, the Court should award
the attorney fees supported by the affidavit, and remand for a full determination of all fees
incurred and all other damages suffered.
Moreover, the question of what efforts were expended for which causes of action
is irrelevant. The black-letter standard is that a prevailing plaintiff should be awarded
"all attorney fees reasonably incurred in the litigation." Dejavue. Inc. v. U.S. Energy
Corp., 1999 UT App. 355, f 20, 993 P.2d 222 (addressing the analogous situation of a
plaintiff bringing multiple claims "involving a common core of facts and related legal
theories" and prevailing on only some of them) (emphasis added). Each and every
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Judge Dever stated that he would only award attorney fees in required to litigate
the breach of contract cause of action (implicitly through Judge Thome's Order and
alleged payment by Bear River). Based upon the district court's statement, Plaintiff
allocated those fees which sought a correct interpretation of the no-fault statute up until
Judge Thome's Order. See Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 1999 UT App 109, ^ 15,
978 P.2d 470 (holding that an allocation is sufficient if the "substance of the process . . .
[results in] separating recoverable from non-recoverable fees."). The arbitrary cut-off
point of the date Bear River finally allegedly paid the PIP benefits it owed to Plaintiff is
incorrect, and this case should be remanded to consider all the attorney fees which were
required to force Bear River to acknowledge its contractual obligations.
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question presented by this litigation relies on a proper interpretation of the no-fault
statute. Because the proper interpretation of the no-fault statute is at the heart of every
cause of action, it cannot be disputed that there is significant overlap. This overlap is
sufficient to award attorney fees for each and every hour expended by Plaintiffs counsel
in connection with this litigation because Bear River's breach of contract, bad faith, fraud,
and breach offiduciaryduty all arose out of its misrepresentation of the contractual terms.
XIII. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL ATTORNEY
FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL.
Appellate courts routinely allow attorney fees on appeal when contracts and/or
statutes expressly provide for fees. See Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 227 (Utah App.
1991). Plaintiff is entitled to recover his attorney fees expended for this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The district court's order should be reversed in its entirety. Judgment should be
entered in favor of Plaintiff stating that Bear River breached its contract, acted in bad
faith by misrepresenting the terms and conditions of its contract, owes fiduciary duties
under its PIP coverage, and it may not raise any defenses to its contractual obligation to
pay PIP benefits (other than fraud or bad faith) which are not clearly and explicitly set
forth in the no-fault statute. Bear River's unlawful claims adjustment techniques, its
misrepresentations, and its failure to give notice of its actions to its insureds constituted
breach of contract, third-party bad faith, and fraud. Because this case does not raise
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individualized medical issues, the district court should be instructed to permit amendment
of the complaint and certify this case as a class action on remand. Trial should then be
had as to damages to Plaintiff and the members of the prospective Class.
Attorney fees should be awarded by this Court in full pursuant to the affidavit of
attorney fees submitted to the district court. The Court should rule, as a matter of law,
that the hours and rates were reasonable and necessary. The district court, on remand,
should then address all attorney fees incurred in connection with this case so far, and
award prospective attorney fees monthly as those fees are incurred.
DATED t h i s ^ / C ^ d a y of September, 2001.
CARR & WADDOUPS
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

/ 7 day of September, 2001, a true and

correct copy of Plaintiff's Appeal Brief was mailed, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
to the following:
Mr. Mr. Joseph J. Joyce
Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Sixth Floor Boston Building
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GARRETT PRINCE,
Plaintiff,

)
)

ORDER

vs.

)

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
CO.,

)
)

Civil No. 970905641CV

)

Judge William A. Thorne

Defendant.

This court, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, having reviewed the memoranda
submitted by the parties, and after hearing oral argument on February 9, 1998, wherein Trent
Waddoups appeared for the plaintiff, Garrett Prince, and Kristin VanOrman appeared on behalf
of Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, has duly considered both plaintiffs and defendant's
motions for summary judgment, together with all supporting memoranda, the court being fully
advised in the premises, hereby submits the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Garrett Prince was at all times relevant herein an insured of Bear River Mutual

Insurance Company.
2.

On May 12, 1997, Mr. Prince was involved in an automobile accident.

3.

After the subject accident, Mr. Prince submitted claims for PIP benefits to Bear

River Mutual.
4.

Bear River hired Dr. Stephen Marble to perform an "independent medical

evaluation" of Mr. Prince.
5.

Dr. Marble concluded that the chiropractic care exceeding 12 weeks of treatment

was not medically necessary, and recommended that Mr. Prince cease chiropractic treatment.
6.

After receiving Dr. Marble's report, Bear River discontinued payment of PIP

benefits except for the first 12 weeks of treatment.
7.

The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a court's ruling in his

favor regarding his claims of breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing,
and tortious breach of fiduciary obligations.
8.

Defendant opposed plaintiffs summary judgment motion, and filed its own

motion for partial summary judgment seeking the dismissal of plaintiff s claims for bad faith,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, tortious violation of public policy, as well as all
punitive damage claims.
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9.

After defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff provided no evidence,

through affidavits or otherwise, to support his claims for emotional distress,fraud,or the tort of
violation of public policy.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307 provides that PIP coverage and benefits include the
"reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, rehabilitation,
including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of
$3,000 per person." U.C.A. §31 A-22-307. Section 31 A-22-307 therefore imposes a "reasonable
and necessary" standard for determining the payment of PIP benefits. This reasonable and
necessary standard does not need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Legislature has
used the term advisedly and the plaintiff must prove "necessary" by a preponderance of the
evidence. Further, the term "necessary" means something more than nonfraudulent claims.
Further, a claim by an insured against his/her insurer for the payment of PIP benefits is a
claim which is first-party in nature. Unlike a third-party situation, where the insurer contracts
to defend the insured against claims made by third parties against the insured and to pay
any resulting liability, up to the specified dollar limit, a first-party situation does not
involve a fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured. Accordingly, tort
claims are not available in the first-party context. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)
3

Further, when a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the
debate concerns a matter of fact or law. In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842
(Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals held that there can be no first-party insurance bad
faith, as a matter of law, if the claim is fairly debatable. Plaintiffs claims in this matter were
fairly debatable as a matter of law.
Further, pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when a motion for
summary judgment is made, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a general issue for trial. The moving party on a motion
for summary judgment need not support his motion with affidavits.
Accordingly, this court hereby orders, adjudges and decrees that plaintiff Garrett Prince's
motion for summary judgment is hereby denied. This court further orders that defendant Bear
River Mutual Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted. This court
further orders that plaintiffs claims for bad faith, infliction of emotional distress, fraud, the tort
of violation of public policy, and all claims for punitive damages filed against Bear River Mutual
Insurance Company are hereby dismissed with prejudice. These judgments are final pursuant to
Rule 54(b).
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So ordered this

^J

day of

/^A^

, 1998.

BY THE COURT:

William
District

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Trent J^^addoups, Esq.
CARR & WADDOUPS
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Order 980220
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Th"d Judicial District

FEB 2 7 W »
LT^COUNTY
"Deputy ClerK

Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657)
CAJRR & WADDOUPS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-0888
Fax: (801)363-8512
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
GARRETT PRINCE,

FINAL ORDER AND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.

Civil No. 9 7 0 9 0 5 6 4 1 CV
Judge L.A. Dever

The Court having ruled that Defendant is liable for costs, compound interest, and
attorney fees and that all other issues raised by the parties are finalized:
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff Garrett Prince be, and hereby is,
awarded JUDGMENT against Defendant Bear River Mutual Insurance Company in the sum
of:
$262.15

Accrued Pre-judgment Normal Interest at 114% per Month
Reasonable Attorney Fees
Accrued Costs to Date of Judgment

•& 0ZZ.&

JUDGMENT

With interest on this Judgment accruing at the rate of 7.657% per annum as provided by law
from the date of this Judgment until paid.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Judgment shall be augmented in the
amount of reasonable costs and attorney fees expended in collecting said Judgment by
execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit.

DATED this '[A day of $5ffl& 2001.
BY THE COURT:

H6nor^
DIST

JUDGMENT DEBTORS ADDRESS:

Bear River Mutual Insurance Company
% Attorneys for Defendant
Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing document to be mailed, postage prepaid, this JL% day of jlatwry, ^601, to:

Ms. Kristin A. VanOrman
STRONG & HANNI
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mr. Trent J. Waddoups
CARR & WADDOUPS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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